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I: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

During the past thirty years, a new kind of criminal activity - hate crime - has been recognized across the country.
How best to define hate crimes and guard against them
has been puzzling legislators in many states. 1 Under conventional criminal law, a perpetrator is convicted and jailed
for committing a bad act against any victim - a non-justified killing is murder or manslaughter, for instance, no
matter who the dead person turns out to be and regardless
of the motivation. But to commit a hate crime, you have to
target someone for a specific reason. The crime must be
motivated in some part by an animus toward, or a specific
opinion about, a person because of his race, religion, ethnicity, or any one of several other particular characteristics.
Although the criminal act may be the same, regardless of
the victim's status, the hate criminal risks a heftier sentence by harming certain people for particular reasons.
Though it is easy to understand hate crime abstractly,
it has proven more difficult to express its essence in legislative enactments. The consequence of legislators' increasing desire to punish acts aimed at people who share particular characteristics has led to a range of laws that are not
1
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always consistent from state to state. In what follows, we
propose a way of sorting out how legislators have sought
to describe and punish what emerging social norms are

defendant prompted the group to "go get him." The group
of about ten young men attacked Reddick, putting him in
a coma for four days.

singling out as particularly pernicious behavior.
The first federal statute to create "federally protected
activities" was enacted in as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, in response to violent attacks on civil rights

The issue in Mitchell was whether a Wisconsin statute
that enhanced the penalty for crimes motivated by a victim's perceived status was constitutional under the First
Amendment. The defendant argued that in penalizing

workers in the south. This federal law criminalized inter-

people for offensive thoughts the statute violated his First

ference with activities such as voting, attending school or
applying for employment because of a person's race,
color, religion or national origin. 2 The statute was significant because for the first time it gave the U.S. Department of Justice the power to investigate hate crimes.

Amendment rights. The Court unanimously disagreed,
noting that the defendant was not being punished for his
bigoted beliefs or statements. Rather, "the Wisconsin
statute singles out for enhancement bias inspired conduct
because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individ-

In the 1980s, catalyzed by studies that indicated an
increase in bias-motivated crimes, the first contemporary

ual and societal harm .... The State's desire to redress
these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation
for its penalty enhancement provision over and above
mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases." 7
Since the pivotal decision in Mitchell, all fifty states

hate-crime statutes were enacted. 3 Many states created
"task forces," similar to President Reagan's "Task Force
on Crime," to study this issue. 4 In addition to state statutes, Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of
1990, which requires the Justice Department to acquire
and compile data on hate crimes annually. 5
In 1993, Wisconsin v. Mitchell upheld the constitutionality of hate crime statutes. ~ In Mitchell, a group of
African-American young men, including the defendant,
became angry after discussing a scene from the film Mississippi Burning in which a white man beat an AfricanAmerican boy who was praying. After the group had a
few drinks, the defendant is quoted as saying, "Do you feel
all hyped up to move on some white people?" Upon seeing
fourteen-year-old Gregory Reddick, who was white, the

have enacted some form of anti-discrimination or hate
crime statute. Not all of these outlaw what might be considered a "hate crime" in the traditional sense, like assaulting a person because of the color of his skin. A few states
have limited their hate crime law to only the most basic

In 1994, Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission to factor in bias or hate into the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 In response, the Commission
amended Section 3Al.1 of the Guidelines so that if "the

2
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"desecration" related crimes; for example, damaging objects like a church, which are revered by particular members of the public.
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finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally
selected any victim or any property as the object of the
offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender,
gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person," the offense level of the crime would be increased,
increasing the applicable sentence range for the crime. 9
In 2009, President Barack Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. 10 The act was named after the victims of two
bias-motivated murders in 1998. Matthew Shepard was a
21-year-old man who was tortured and murdered be-

At a luncheon commemo rating the act's signing,
President O ba ma sa id:

cause he was homosexual. James Byrd, Jr. was a 49-year
old father who was brutally murdered by three white assailants in Texas because he was African-American.
Among other things, the 2009 Act gives the Depart-

You understood that we must sta nd aga inst
crimes that are mea nt not only to brea k
bones, but to brea k spirits - not only to
inflict ha rm, but to instill fea r . .. th rough
this law, we will strengthen the protections
aga inst crimes based on the color of your
skin , the fa ith in your hea rt, or the place
of your birth . We will fin ally add federa l
protections aga inst crimes based on gender, disa bility, gender identity, or sex ual
orientation. And prosecutors will have new
tools to work with states in order to prosecute to the fullest those who would
perpetrate such crimes. Because no one in
America should ever be afraid to wa lk
down the street holding the hands of the
person they love. No one in America
should be fo rced to look over their shoulder beca use of who they are or beca use
they live with a di sa bility. 12

ment of Justice jurisdiction over some hate crimes. The
law allows federal prosecution when a state's Attorney
General certifies that the state lacks the ability to prosecute the hate crime, the state requests that the federal
government prosecute the crime, the sentence obtained
by the state did not serve the federal interest of eradicating hate crimes, or a federal prosecution is in the public
interest. 11 Federal investigators and federal grand juries
are given unfettered discretion to investigate hate crimes.
This law has not yet had much of an effect. Fewer than
100 people have been charged under the statute since its
enactment, and no convictions have been obtained.

In the short history of hate crime laws, th e statistics
indicate that racially-motivated hate crimes have been
and are still the most prevalent, accounting fo r approx imately 48.5% of reported hate crimes in 2009. In th at
sa me yea r religiously-motivated incidents accounted for
19.7% of hate crimes; sex ua l orientation-motivated incidents, 18.5%, and incidents motivated by ethnicit y,
11.8% .1 3

4
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11: DEFINITION OF HATE CRIME

actually deal with those subjects. Also, some hate crime
laws prohibit acts that would not be criminal but for the
prohibited motive, further confounding any effort to list
two elements that all hate crime laws share.
There is no universal definition of a hate crime. Some
states cite characteristics such as race, sexual orientation,
and disability very specifically in the text of the statute as
protected characteristics. Other states have laws worded so
broadly that any crime committed because of any one of
the victim's characteristics might trigger the statute. In federal and most state law the victim's actual characteristics
are immaterial. As long as a crime was committed or the
victim chosen because the defendant believed the victim belonged to a particular group, the hate crime law applies.

In some states, a hate crime is broadly defined as any
crime in which the victim, or the particular criminal
action, was chosen because of the actual or perceived
characteristics of any person (not necessarily the victim).
In other states, a hate crime is narrowly defined as a particular criminal action intended to intimidate or harass
the victim because of the victim's characteristics. Some
hate crimes don't appear, even on their face, to be haterelated, such as desecration-related crimes, but we include
them in this monograph because the acts covered by
those laws, church or cross burning, for example, are
often committed with the same hate motive present in
more traditional hate crimes.
Two elements comprise most hate crimes: (1) a criminal act that is (2) committed with a bias motive. The first
element merely means that the legislature must declare
the action criminal. Criminal acts can range from established crimes, like murder or assault, to acts as simple as
causing physical contact with a person.14 The second element, bias motive, is what sets hate crimes apart from
any other category of crime. It is also the harder element
to prove, because it requires evidence of the mental state
of the assailant at the time the offense was committed.
However, not all hate crimes fall neatly into this definition. Some hate crime laws do not actually require a
hate or bias motive, but the law obviously applies when
that motive exists. 15 Since not all hate crime laws actually
refer to hate or bias, it can be difficult to define what laws

The primary objective of hate crime legislation is to protect against the harm a diverse society suffers when
people are victimized simply for being who they are. The
idea is that when certain people are targeted because they
belong to a certain social category, society is damaged
more than when crimes happen for other reasons. For
example, the New York legislature has stated that "crimes
motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups
not only harm individual victims but send a powerful
message of intolerance and discrimination to all members
of the group to which the victim belongs. Hate crimes

6
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can and do intimidate and disrupt entire communities
and vitiate the civility that is essential to healthy demo-

sure the punishment is proportionate to the harm. 17 The
Court in Mitchell said: "bias-motivated crimes are more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emo-

cratic processes. In a democratic society, citizens cannot
be required to approve of the beliefs and practices of others, but must never commit criminal acts on account of
them." 16 The premise is that the fear generated in various

tional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest." 18 Since the consequences of hate crimes are more se-

groups when a member is targeted for that characteristic

vere, the punishments for hate crimes should be more
severe as well.

requires an additional response to the crime.
There are other, highly debated reasons why hate

Incapacitation

crime legislation exists. We address how the five theories
of punishment - retribution, incapacitation, deterrence,
rehabilitation and restoration -

relate to hate crimes.

Retribution

Incapacitation is the theory that punishing offenders
through imprisonment is justified because it removes
immoral and dangerous people from the rest of society,
preventing them from causing further harm. Since biasmotivated crimes cause a greater harm to society as a whole

On the simplest level, retribution theory proclaims

than ordinary crimes, the people who commit these crimes

that someone who caused harm else deserves to be harmed
in return. Hate crimes might deserve stiffer penalties be-

are more dangerous to society. The longer they are imprisoned, the longer they are prevented from committing another crime against individuals and society. 1 ~

cause of their social detriments. Not placing some kind of
enhancement on such an act would be condoning it, leaving law enforcement without a way to respond to instances
involving a more heinous motive than common crimes.
The damage the crime does to society, in addition to the
individual victim, warrants an additional response.
Under retribution theory, hate crime legislation exists
because bias-motivated crimes are more severe. It's a theory based largely on a proportionality argument. Hate
crimes differ from ordinary offenses in that they have a
greater psychological and social impact on the individual

This theory is prevalent throughout most hate-crime
laws. Most such statutes do not provide for assistance to
the victim or the victim's community or any other method
of trying to repair the harm caused by the hate crime.
Most simply require or permit a hate crime defendant to
be sentenced to longer periods of incarceration. A subscriber to the policies of incapacitation theory, along with
retribution, would support this response to hate crimes.
Deterrence

and the group that the victim represents. The sentencing
enhancements associated with bias-motivated crimes en-

Deterrence theory presupposes that the threat of a
harsher punishment will discourage people from engag-

8
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ing in offenses motivated by bias. An example needs to be
made of those who commit hate crimes to deter others
who might commit them.20 An example also needs to be
made of the particular offender so that he or she will not
commit future hate crimes.
There are arguments that deterrence might not be effective for hate crimes. Many hate crime offenders are
unaware of hate crime laws. 21 Furthermore, the chances
that a crime will actually be prosecuted as a hate crime
are unknown. A hate-crime prosecution can happen only
if there are provable circumstantial facts of the perpetrator's state of mind when committing the crime. A person
who is aware of the hate-crime law might commit his
crime in a way to make sure no evidence of the motive
exists, such as choosing to not yell racial epithets when
committing the crime.
A common response is that the enhanced penalties
can deter systemic or systematic hate crimes. By punishing these acts more harshly, the government sends a
warning to individuals who might otherwise engage in
hate crimes on a regular basis. Groups such as the Ku
Klux Klan and various Neo-Nazi groups, which publicly
express bias against people with particular characteristics, will undoubtedly know about hate crime laws. The
laws may generally deter hate crimes by these groups or
individual members of these groups.

tation as a purpose for enacting hate-crime statutes argue
th at improving the offender makes him less likely to offe nd aga in .22 For example, Pennsylvani a specifica lly allows for rehabilitative sentences fo r hate crime offenders.
If, in the opinion of the court, th e defendant would benefit , the court ca n sentence that defendant to community
se rvice for certain bias-related offenses.H Such sentences
are simila r to the those encompassed in the state's Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Prog ram. 24
M any states permit or require judges to order defendants convicted of hate crimes to attend di ve rsit y o r behavioral training courses. These courses ca n be forced
upon defendants whether or not the sentence includes incarceration . Some states even require th e defendant to
work with the victim or oth er people with that victim's
characteristics, often forcing the defendant to fulfill community service sentences within th e harmed community.
Restoration

Though not every state statute provides rehabilitation
for bias-crime offenders, some do. Proponents of rehabili-

The fifth principle, restoration, has been ga ining significant traction as a purpose fo r hate crime laws. The
punishments that fulfill this purpose are usually community
service and payment or labor to repair property damage.
The most striking exa mple is the Colorado law that allow
the victim s of hate crimes to ask the court to place the defendant into altern ative dispute resolution.ZS The defendant will no longer be charged with a hate crime, but will
receive collateral punishments th at are supposed to help
mend the damage he or she caused to the victim and the
victim's community.

10
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The premise underlying the theory of restoration is
that hate-crime laws should prevent damage to the community and fear among vulnerable classes of people. Restoration addresses those concerns by forcing defendants
to mend the harm that they caused, letting the community and the victim know that the state is stepping in to
protect or redress them. It also exposes the wrongdoer to
the harmed community and to confront the damage his
or her actions caused within that community. In this way,
this theory meshes with rehabilitative justice concerns.
California provides an example of a law explicitly
stating that one of the principal goals of the state's hatecrime statutes is restorative justice for both the victim
and the community. The laws are supposed to take into
consideration "restorative justice for the immediate victims of the hate crimes and for the classes of persons terrorized by the hate crimes." 26

Speci"fic Hate Related Acts: Prohibit acts that are unmistakably motivated by bias. For example, burning a
cross on someone's lawn or spray painting a swastika on
a religious center are hate-related acts.

V: EXPLAINING THE TYPES OF HATE
CRIMES

Hate crime legislation (sometimes called "bias" legislation) can have an effect on evidentiary, jurisdictional, and
sentencing issues. We describe our category system of
types and sub-types of hate crime laws and discuss issues
presented by each of those subtypes.
Type I: Creation of a New Crime

We have divided hate crime statutes into four categories,
and each category into specific subtypes.
The four general categories of hate crime laws are:
Creation of a New Crime: Create new, separate statutes prohibiting bias-related crimes.
Sentence Enhancement: Enhance the severity of the
sentence for crimes proven to be motivated by bias.
Sentence Enhancement (Aggravating Factors): Treat
bias as an aggravating factor when determining a sentence.

Many states have passed laws declaring that certain
actions constitute a new crime when the act was committed, or the victim was chosen, because of the victim's
characteristics or membership in a particular group.
These laws proscribe specific acts which on their own are
usually already punishable under a different statute.
These acts can be described in a list of specific actions or
by reference to other criminal offenses. The states with
this form of law have decided to make bias-motivated
acts punishable under separate and distinct criminal statutes. These hate-crime laws always include a motive element, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite
bias.

12
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Subtype 1.1: Prohibit committing other crimes, but
add a bias element

to

A statute must meet three criteria to fall into this sub-

almost always be the case. It also does not require any

category. It must: (1) prohibit committing other statuto-

animosity toward the individual or group of individuals.

rily defined crimes, which themselves are misdemeanors

Rather, the law, and most laws similar to Illinois', merely

or felonies; (2) prohibit committing those underlying

state that the crime must be motivated by any feelings

crimes, picking the victim, or both, because of a bias

about any individual or group of individuals. This is an

be satisfied by bias about actual or perceived charac-

teristics of the victim, although that scenario will likely

against or hatred toward a person; and (3) declare that a

aspect common in the broadest hate crime statutes. While

violation of th e law is a felony or misdemeanor.

seemingly ridiculous, a person could be charged with a

Illinois provides an example of how a new criminal
statute uses other criminal statutes as the underlying act.

hare crime if, because he hares homosexuals and was
forced to work with homosex uals, he throws rocks at cars

The state's hate crime statute provides that "a person commits a hate crime when, by reason of the actual or per-

nection between the victims and the characteristics he

ceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual
orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin of another individual or group of individuals, regardless of the existence of any other motivating factor or factors, he commits" one of 15 listed crimes.27

in his neighborhood when he gets home. There is no con has a bias about, yet he still committed a crime because
of the actual or perceived characteristics of an individual
or group of individuals, so the hate crime would be
applicable.

These underlying crimes range from assault to ha-

This kind of language also leaves open the possibility
that a prosecutor, working within the terms of the stat-

rassment by telephone to theft. Separate and distinct from

ute, could charge a hate crime even though the defendant

the underlying offense, a violation of this hate crime stat-

feels no actual hatred toward the victim. A defendant

ute is a crime on its own. Prosecutors pursuing charges
under this statute will charge the hate crime in addition

who chose to steal from a Bosnian victim because he believed that people from Bosnia are less likely to report
thefts to the police would violate this law. A more far-

to the underlying crime. 28 To convict under this statute,
the prosecution must prove all elements of the underlying
crime and the added element of commission of that crime

fetched example, but still theoretically possible, is a ca-

because of the actual or perceived characteristics of "another individual or group of individuals, regardless of the

Polish descent. The defendant could have no bias at all
against people from whichever country the victim hap-

existence of any other motivating factor or factors." 29
In the Illinois statute, the bias element does not need
14

reer thief who would only rob people who were not of

pens to be from. The fact that the defendant committed
the particular crime against the particular victim because

15
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of a national origin-related belief (that robbing Polish
people was unacceptable) could still trigger this kind of
hate-crime statute. 30
Subtype 1.2: Prohibit specific actions when committed because of bias
To fall into this category, a statute must: (1) prohibit
specific actions, with no reference to another statute, even
if the actions would satisfy the elements of another crime;
(2) prohibit committing those acts, picking the victim, or
both, because of a bias toward or hatred of a person; and
(3) declare that a violation of the statute is a crime.
Michigan's "Ethnic Intimidation" law is highly representative of this kind of statute. It provides that "a person
is guilty of ethnic intimidation if that person maliciously,
and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another
person because of that person's race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, does any of the following" acts. 31
These acts include causing "physical contact with another
person," property destruction, and threats. 32 These acts
are not tied to any other criminal statute, though the underlying conduct can often be charged as a separate crime.
Statutes such as Michigan's require that the prosecution prove an intent to intimidate or harass. Other statutes falling into this subcategory, such as the federal hate
crime statute, do not have this element. The federal hate
crime statute prohibits causing "bodily injury to any person ... because of the actual or perceived [characteristics] of any person." 33 This difference can have important
practical implications. An accusatory instrument34 charging a violation of a statute requiring proof of the intent to

intimidate or harass, but containing no allegations of that
specific intent, may be facially insufficient. A facially insufficient accusatory instrument does not allege facts
which, if true, establish reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant committed every element of every offense
charged. 35
For example, an accusatory instrument in Michigan
that merely alleges that a group of white people attacked
a black man would likely be insufficient to support the
crime of "ethnic intimidation." Though the attack might
have been motivated by race, the motive cannot be inferred simply by the fact that the defendants and victim
were of different race. However, an accusatory instrument that also alleges that the attackers were yelling racial epithets at the victim while the attack was taking
place, or had just come from a Ku Klux Klan rally, would
likely be sufficient.

Subtype 1.3: Prohibit deprivation of or interfering
with another's civil rights
A statute in this category can take a variety of forms.
However, to fall within this category, a statute must: (1)
prohibit behavior intended to interfere with, or deprive
others of, certain civil rights; and (2) make a violation of
the statute a felony or misdemeanor. Some jurisdictions
protect civil rights expansively, such as all rights guaranteed to a person by the Constitution and laws of both the
United States and the particular state ..i 6 Other jurisdictions include only specific protections, the most limited
being a protection of the right to "to life, liberty, pursuit
of happiness or the necessities of life," excluding all oth-

16
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ers.37 Some laws of this subtype prohibit violation of a
single right, interference with religious worship. 38 There
is a continuum between these extremes, though most
statutes in this subtype tend to be fairly expansive.
A bias or hate motive is not an element of most of
these statutes. The only constant across all these statutes
is the motive of intent to interfere with or deprive others
of civil rights. However, a few states have passed legislation declaring that a person has a civil right to be free of
the various forms bias or hate crimes might take. It is possible that a prosecutor can charge a crime of interference
with civil rights based on a defendant's violation of the
victim's separately established civil right to be free of bias
or hate-related actions. The victim's right to be free of this
form of crime is established in one statute, usually in a
"Human Rights" or "Civil Rights" section of the state's
statutory code. The defendant is punished for interfering
with that right on the basis of another, related statute.
Maine provides a good example of how this dualstatute strategy could be used. Maine has established a
civil right to be free of bias or hate-related acts. The relevant statute declares that "for purposes of this chapter
and Title 17, section 2931 , a person has the right to engage in lawful activities without being subject to physical
force or violence, damage or destruction of property, trespass on property or the threat of physical force or violence motivated by reason of race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical or mental disability or
sexual orientation." 39 Title 17, section 2931, declares that
"a person may not, by force or threat of force, intention-

ally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally
attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that
person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State
or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United
States."40 A violation of section 2931 is a crime.41 These
two statutes, together, create a new right (to be free of
hate crimes) and criminalize the violation of that new
right (the violation being commission of a hate crime).
On its face, Maine's criminal statute prohibiting acts
interfering with or depriving others of civil rights would
seem to be only mildly related to bias or hate crimes.
However, because of the separately established right to be
free of hate or bias-related actions, the statute can actually be used to prosecute hate crimes.42 In a jurisdiction
that has not enacted a civil right like the one in Maine, a
statute prohibiting acts interfering or depriving others of
civil rights has a much more limited effect. Only highly
specific acts, like interfering with voting rights, could
apply to the law.
In states with statutes prohibiting interference with
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution or laws, the
federal statute on interfering with rights becomes a
weapon against hate crimes. The rights guaranteed by the
federal statute are not extensive, but it lists some rights
which are protected against interference when that interference is motivated by bias or hate against a short list of
characteristics.43 Even if the state itself has not established
a civil right to be free of bias or hate related acts, very

18
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specific acts might still be prosecutable if they were in-

carceration must be proven to the finder of fact, usually a

tended to interfere with these federally guaranteed rights.

jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 4

Subtype 2 .1 : Increase the degree of all, or almost all,
Type 2: Sentencing Enhancements

crimes

Many states have sentencing enhancement statutes
which increase the potential punishment a defendant can

A statute of this subtype must meet three criteria. It
must (1) indicate that it applies to any crime, or at least

receive when certain acts are committed, or the victim is

a lmost all crimes which have a victim; (2) require proof

chosen, because of the victim's characteristics or mem-

of bias, prejudice, or hate as a reason for the crime or rea-

bership in a particular group. These statutes can take a

son for picking the victim; and (3) reclassify such crimes

variety of forms. Some require the court to impose a
harsher penalty while others merely allow it. Some in-

as a higher degree or level within the state's criminal law,

crease the potential penalty by raising the level or degree

can receive.

of the bias crime within the state's penal law, while other
statutes merely increase the potential length of incarcera-

An example of this kind of law is a Florida statute titled "Evidence prejudice while committing offense; re-

tion or add collateral punishments. Some of these laws

classification." It reads that "the penalty for any felony or

apply to any crime in the jurisdiction while others apply

misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this sub-

only to crimes related to intimidation or harassment. For
all sentencing enhancement laws, the prosecutor must

section if the commission of such fe lony or misdemeanor
evidences prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, eth-

prove the underlying crime in addition to whatever ele-

nicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, home-

ment is required for the enhancement.
The statute itself will usually list what factors trigger

less status, mental or physical disability, or advanced age
of the victim."45 The statute specifies how each type of

the sentencing enhancement. In some states the factor is
determined by the finder of fact at trial, under a reason-

crime should be reclassified. For example, a misdemeanor
of the second degree becomes a misdemeanor of the first

able doubt standard, just as if it were an element of the

degree. 46

crime. In others, the court determines the factor after the
defendant has been convicted of the underlying crime.
Sentencing enhancements vary tremendously from state

Laws like this often do not require prejudice to be the
sole motivation for the crime or choice of victim. 47 In
Florida, and many other states with similar laws, it is

to state. However they are structured, under the rule set

enough that prejudice was at least part of the motivation .

down in 2000 in Apprendi v. New Jersey, any enhancement that increases the maximum allowable length of in-

Prejudice becomes an additional element, one not located
in the text defining the underlying crime. Since it is set up
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thereby increasing the potential sentence the defendant
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as a penalty enhancement for a huge swath of crimes, this
subtype of hate-crime statute will always be found in a
separate section of a state's criminal code, apart from the
substantive offenses.
Laws that increase the degree of crime are broad, and
can be applied to a wide variety of different situations. By
its very terms, a subtype 2.1 statute does not usually require "hatred," as the word is commonly used. Consider
Florida's statute again. All that the statute requires is that
the defendant show prejudice against one of the listed
groups. As an example, consider a scene in Stanley Kubrick's movie "A Clockwork Orange." The main character and his gang travel around an English city committing
a series of horrific crimes, including assaulting a homeless
man. This crime seems to be committed because of the
gang's feelings about the homeless man's relative vulnerability. They probably believe that he is less likely to report the crime or defend himself than a non-homeless
person. Even though the gang does not hate the victim in
any conventional sense, the assault could be charged as a
hate crime under Florida's law. The prejudice that the
gang is evidencing is the belief that homeless people are
more vulnerable.
Queens County, New York, has used New York's
hate crime statute in a creative way. New York's statute
increases the level of a crime under situations very similar
to Florida's. The statute applies if a defendant selects the
victim or commits the crime "in whole or in substantial
part because of a belief or perception regarding the race,
color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious

practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person,
regardless of whether that belief or perception is correct."48 The statute applies to "specified offenses," but the
list of specified offenses is extremely long and covers a
huge variety of crimes. Queens County prosecutors have
capitalized on the expansive language by applying the
hate crime statutes to mortgage fraud cases with elderly
victims. In these cases, defendants targeted elderly victims because the defendants believed that elderly people
were easier targets or that they were more likely to have
substantial home equity. Queens County prosecutors
have secured at least five guilty pleas or convictions for
grand larceny with a hate-crime enhancement under
these or similar circumstancesY
The bias that triggers the New York law and laws
like it does not need to match the victim's actual characteristics. For example, consider a man who goes to a bar
looking to start a fight, but believes that Germans are
better fighters, so he doesn't want to fight a German. He
fights a person at the bar when he learns that the person
is not German. Though this scenario is farfetched, the
fight could theoretically trigger New York's hate crimestatute because the perpetrator selected the victim on the
basis of a belief about the national origin of a person,
even though the person he had the belief about was a person other than the victim .
Some states have different approaches for different
levels of crime. Delaware, for example, has a statute that
contains two different hate crime enhancements. For misdemeanors and crimes which are lesser C, D, E, For G
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felonies, the statute falls into subtype 2.1, as the level of
the crime is increased. 50 However, A and B felonies found
to be hate crimes have their minimum sentences doubled,
without increasing the degree of the crime. These belong
in Subtype 2.3, below. Similar nuances exist in many
jurisdictions.
Statutes like New York's raise an interesting dilemma.
In many states, lower criminal courts have full subjectmatter jurisdiction over all stages of misdemeanor criminal cases, but only preliminary jurisdiction over felonies
(meaning that a judge sitting in the lower court could not
oversee the trial, for example). The increase in criminal
degree from misdemeanor to felony would seem to remove subject-matter jurisdiction from lower criminal

potential sentence. Though this type of statute works in
much the same way as those in Subtype 2.1, they are more
limited in scope. Unlike Subtype 2.1 enhancements, some
of these enhancements are contained within the statutes
prohibiting the underlying crimes; they are not always set
out in a separate statute.
Many laws in Minnesota's criminal code have hatecrime enhancements built into the law prohibiting the underlying conduct. Two examples are the laws dealing
with harassment and stalking and with property damage.
Bias against the characteristics of the victim or someone
else increases the degree of the crime.
Minnesota's harassment and stalking statute prohibits
a number of different acts, including stalking, making ha-

courts even though the underlying crime was a misdemeanor. 51 We suspect that a crime that is enhanced to a
felony would need to be heard by a court with jurisdiction over felonies. This issue is less clear in Subtypes 2.3
and 2.4, discussed below, where the statute increases the
potential punishment into the felony range (usually more
than a year's imprisonment) without changing the crime's
degree from misdemeanor to felony.
Subtype 2.2: Increase degree of crimes involving intimidation or harassment
A statute must meet three criteria to fall into this category. It must: (1) apply only to crimes involving intimidation or harassment; (2) require proof of bias, prejudice, or
hate as a reason for committing the crime or picking the
victim; and (3) reclassify crimes which show this evidence
or proof as a higher degree crime, thereby increasing the

rassing phone calls, and manifesting an intent to injure
the person, property, or rights of another. 52 It classifies
these acts as a gross misdemeanor. Under the subdivision,
"Aggravated Violations," a person who commits any of a
set of listed acts is guilty of a felony. The first act on the
list is committing any of the harassing acts "because of
the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability ... age, or national origin."53 Thus, having a prohibited subjective motivation for committing any of the listed acts increases the
criminal level of harassment from a misdemeanor to a
felony.
Minnesota's statute prohibiting damage to property is
set up similarly. The statute defines four degrees of the
crime. An increase in degree can be due to the crime's
being motivated by "the property owner's or another's ac-
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statute in innovative ways, like the financial crimes prosecutions in Queens.

Subtype 2.3: Add jail time or other consequences for
all, or almost all, crimes
Statutes in this category can mandate a variety of different additiona l penalties if a defendant is convicted of
a lmost any crime deemed to be a hate or bias-related
crime. Some statutes tack additiona l time onto the maximum or minimum sentence that could otherwise be imposed. Some statutes require a convicted defendant to
complete behavior modification programs. Other statutes
require a convicted defendant to complete community
serv ice or pay reparations to either the victim or the community. The key element that places a hate crime statute
into this category is that the statute discretely defines a
specific enhanced or additional penalty. These statutes do
not change the degree of the underlying crime.
Rhode Island's Hate Crime Sentencing Act is a clear
example of a law that increases mandatory incarceration.
This statute applies to any defendant who has been convicted of intentionally selecting "the person against whom
the offense is committed or [selecting] the property that is
damaged or otherwise affected by the offense because of
the actor's hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived disability, religion, color, race, national origin or
ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of that person or
the owner or occupant of that property." 57 The hatred or
animus must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by either the finder of fact at trial or the judge at sentencing.
The statute imposes mandatory enhanced sentences: for
misdemeanors, a minimum sentence of thirty days imprisonment; for fe lonies, an additional sentence of be-
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tual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability ... age, or national origin."54 Nebraska
puts the enhancement and the underlying crimes in separate statutes. A statute titled "Enhanced penalty; enumerated offenses" applies to a list of 20 criminal statutes, including manslaughter, assau lt, sexual assault, arson,
crimina l trespass, and even application of graffiti . The
hate-crime statute refers to these other crimes, but unlike
Minnesota's property damage law, the enhancement and
the underlying crimes are not contained in the same section of the penal law.
The enhancement statute prohibits committing "one
or more of the .. . [listed] offenses against a person or a
person's property because of the person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability or because of the person's association with a person of a certain race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age,
or disability." 55 The prosecution must prove beyond areasonable doubt that this motivation was a cause of the underlying crime.56
Subtype 2.2 hate-crime statutes are much more narrowly tailored to acts that one might normally think of as
hate-motivated crimes than acts criminalized in states
like New York. Although subtype 2.2 statutes generally
don't use the word "hate," the limited list of crimes or
acts often restricts the statutes' use to just such a motivation. This restriction keeps prosecutors from using the
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tween one and five years. This additional sentence must
run consecutively (after the sentence for the underlying
crime has been served).

up to one year's incarceration, can be sentenced to up to
18 months. However, the criminal degree is not enhanced
to a felony. As noted above, there is no consensus .over

Louisiana has a law that increases the potential penalty for defendants convicted of a hate crime. It differs
from the Rhode Island statute by listing the underlying
crimes to which it applies. However, the list is so extensive
that the statute essentially applies to almost any crime
which could be committed against the person or property
of another because of the other's characteristics, including
crimes beyond those typically intended to intimidate or
harass. The statute makes it "unlawful for any person to
select the victim of the following offenses against person
or property because of actual or perceived race, age, gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, or ancestry of that person or the owner
or occupant of that property because of actual or perceived membership or service in, or employment with, an
organization."58 The statute lists 33 crimes against person
or property, ranging from murder to molestation to "communicating false information of planned arson." 59 The
court is permitted to sentence a defendant who falls under
this statute to an additional $500 fine or an additional six
months' incarceration, or both, if the underlying crime is
a misdemeanor. If the underlying crime is a felony, the
defendant may be fined an additional $5,000, or sentenced to an additional five years' incarceration, or both.
As in Rhode Island, the enhanced sentences in Louisiana run consecutively. A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, which usually permits a maximum sentence of

how the enhancement statute affects subject-matter jurisdiction. It is unclear if a lower criminal court judge, with
jurisdiction limited to misdemeanors, would still have
subject-matter jurisdiction if the misdemeanor had a
maximum possible sentence of more than one year, which
is typically felony-only territory.
We also place statutes that mandate collateral punishments into Subtype 2.3. Collateral punishments are penalties other than incarceration. The most common collateral
punishments for hate or bias-related crimes are fines and
reparations, community service, and participation in di versity programs. Most of the jurisdictions which have enacted these collateral punishments have tied them to specific intimidation and harassment crimes. However, a few
have tied the collateral punishments to all, or almost all,
hate or bias-related crimes.
California has two statutes that allow or mandate
community service as an additional punishment for people convicted of bias-related crimes. One of these is related
to specific intimidation acts that are intended to interfere
with the rights of others and motivated by the victim's
characteristics. California also has a catch-all statute authorizing the court to "order a defendant who is convicted
of a hate crime to perform a minimum of community service, not to exceed 400 hours, co be performed over a period not to exceed 350 days." 6° California separately defines hate crime to mean "a criminal act committed, m
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whole or in part, because of one or more of the following
actual or perceived characteristics of the victim: (1) disability, (2) gender, (3) nationality, (4) race or ethnicity, (5)
religion, (6) sexual orientation, or (7) association with a
person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics."61 Any crime that falls under the
definition of hate crime may, at the judge's discretion, be
subject to the community service punishment.
When an enhancement increases incarceration, the
enhancement can affect plea bargaining. A defendant will
be unable to receive certain promises when pleading if that
plea is to a hate or bias-related crime. Mandatory minimums or mandatory additional incarceration time can limit
what penalty can be agreed to in exchange for a guilty plea.
Furthermore, on exercising enhancement discretion, a judge
might negate a plea with an agreed-upon punishment if
that plea is to a hate crime.
Laws mandating or permitting collateral punishments
are discussed more extensively in the next section. However, practitioners in jurisdictions with laws similar to California's must be aware of the possibility of a community
service penalty. A client in California might be less willing
to plead guilty when the prosecutor has promised to recommend no jail time if he is aware that the sentence might
include up to 350 hours of community service.
Subtype 2.4: Add jail time or other consequences for
crimes involving harassment or intimidation
Laws falling into this subcategory are very similar to
those in Subtype 2.3. The statutes are just as varied. Some
statutes increase the mandatory or possible incarceration

period for hate or bias-related crimes. Some mandate fines
or reparations, community service, or attendance at diversity programs. The key distinction between this subcategory and Subtype 2.3 is that the underlying acts and
crimes in this category are closely related to harassment
or intimidation. This narrower view of applicable crimes
ensures that the requisite motive is a more traditional
"hatred," as opposed simply to bias. None of these penalty enhancements change the criminal degree of the underlying crime.
One of Nevada's hate-crime statutes increases the penalty for certain crimes committed with a bias motive. The
statute lists ten specific crimes to which it applies, ranging
from kidnapping to sexual assault to "mayhem" (disfiguring another person). The statute applies if the defendant
willfully commits any of the listed crimes "because the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin,
physical or mental disability or sexual orientation of the
victim was different from that characteristic of the perpetrator."62 The statute allows for an increased and consecutive sentence of one to 20 years' incarceration.
Colorado has an interesting sentencing structure
related to collateral punishments. It is not technically an
enhancement, but it does provide for punishments additional to the sentence for the underlying crime. The statute states that the alternative sentences provided for "shall
be in addition to and not in lieu of any other sentence received by the offender."63 However, these alternatives are
for a first time bias-crime offender, and the language
seems to suggest that the underlying penalty will be
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Type 3: Aggravating Factors

reduced if these alternatives are used. The statute permits
the judge to consider sentencing the defendant to "useful

Another type of sentence-related law for bias-related

community service intended to benefit the public and

crimes lists bias as an aggravating sentencing factor. Ag-

enhance the offender's understanding of the impact of the
offense upon the victim," or to refer the case to some
form of restorative justice dispute resolution program. 64
The restorative justice program can be imposed only if it
is requested by the victim. The Colorado law allows for a
resolution focusing on restorative and rehabilitative concerns. Collateral punishments can be a definite aid for

gravating factors don't change the level of crime and they
don't mandate that the defendant receive an enhanced
penalty. Aggravating factors simply serve as guides to inform judges that the legislature believes that harsher penalties, within a statutorily allowed range, are appropriate

defense attorneys seeking to get lenient sentences for a client who might otherwise face a stiff prison sentence for
committing a hate crime.
Massachusetts has a more direct form of the collateral
punishment scheme. The state makes it a new crime to commit an assault or battery upon a person, or damage the property of that person, "with the intent to intimidate such person
because of such person's race, color, religion, national origin,
sexual orientation, or disability." 65 A conviction under this ·
statute comes with collateral punishments. One is an additional fine, which helps fund the state's Diversity Awareness
Education Trust Fund. The defendant is also required to complete a diversity awareness program while incarcerated or
while on probation. Furthermore, "the court may also order
restitution to the victim in any amount up to three times the
value of property damage." These potentially substantial
fines may be sticking points for defendants considering taking a plea, especially poor clients, who might not have the

under these circumstances.
While non-binding for sentencing, these statutes can be
important. One aggravating factor can often be the difference between no jail time and incarceration. For the most
serious crimes, an aggravating factor can be the difference
between incarceration and the death penalty. 66 Furthermore, sentencing ranges are often broad. An aggravating
factor can mean a difference of years in prison for a defendant. An aggravating factor can also be used by a sentencing
judge to lengthen other penalties, such as probation.
Some aggravating factor laws apply to all, or most,
crimes, and others apply only to specific crimes (which
usually involve harassment or intimidation). We classify
statutes that allow for bias to be an aggravating factor for
all, or almost all, crimes as Subtype 3.1. Statutes which
limit the crimes the law applies to are referred to as Subtype 3.2. Because there is no significant difforence between the ways the two types of statutes are structured,
we discuss the two subtypes together.
West Virginia's statute authorizing the use of bias as

money, or clients who hold strong emotions about the situation, who might object to giving money to the victim.

an aggravating factor is one of the most direct approaches:
"the fact a person committed a felony or misdemeanor,
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or attempted to commit a felony, because of the victim's
race, color, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation
or sex, shall be considered a circumstance in aggravation
of any crime in imposing sentence."67
Other states have slightly less direct statutes that nonetheless have the same effect. These usually list bias as one
of a number of aggravating factors. For example, a subsection of the Kansas law reads: "the following nonexclusive list of aggravating factors may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for
departure exist." The third item on the list is that "the offense was motivated entirely or in part by the race, color,
religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of
the victim or the offense was motivated by the defendant's belief or perception, entirely or in part, of the race,
color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of the victim whether or not the defendant's belief
or perception was correct."68 For purposes of the statute, "departure" means a sentence other than the presumptive
sentence for a particular crime.
It is unlikely that the statute dealing with aggravating
factors will use the word "bias" in either its title or short
summary. Most statutes are structured like Kansas's,
where bias is merely included in a laundry list of aggravating factors.
Kentucky is an example of a jurisdiction limiting the
crimes for which bias can be an aggravating factor. The
law has a short list of substantive offenses, including
assault, arson, and harassment. The statute states "a
person may be found by the sentencing judge to have

The final category of hate-crime laws includes highly
specific crimes. These crimes generally do not require any
bias- or hate-related subjective motivation. However, some
of these laws are so specialized and specific that they are
usually applicable only to acts committed for those rea-
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committed [one of the listed offenses] as a result of a
hate crime if the person intentionally [commits any of
the listed crimes] because of race, color, religion, sexual
orientation, or national origin of another individual or
group of individuals" 69 The statute directs the sentencing judge to "determine if, by a preponderance of the
evidence presented at the trial, a hate crime was a
primary factor in the commission of the crime by the
defendant." A determination that a hate crime was a
primary factor "may be utilized by the sentencing judge
as the sole factor for denial of probation, shock probation,
conditional discharge, or other form of non-imposition
of a sentence of incarceration." 7° Finally, the hate crime
determination can also be used by a parole board in
delaying or denying parole.
Kentucky provides an example of an aggravating factor statute that is limited and highly expansive at the
same time. The statute is obviously limited in that it applies to only 28 statutes, which are basically various levels of eight to 10 substantive crimes. The statute is also
broad in that it specifically declares a wide range of negative consequences a defendant can be subject to if it is determined that the crime was prompted by bias.
Type 4: Specific Hate- or Bias-Related Acts
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sons. This category includes actions like putting a burning
cross on an African-American's property or branding a

or of causing them to do any act which is unlawful." 72
The statute explicitly notes that exhibit includes items

Jewish person's house with a swastika.
This category also includes a general desecration subtype. Desecration is frequently outlawed in state criminal
codes. This type of law prohibits damaging a number of
different things, varying from state to state, which are revered by members of the public. The most commonly
protected are places of worship, cemeteries, and flags. We
have included desecration as a subtype because of the
protections of places of worship and, in some cases, religious symbols. Defacement of these often stem from hate
or bias.
Note that all of these statutes need to be carefully
worded to avoid running afoul of the First Amendment. 71
The statutes need to be geared toward preventing certain
harms, as opposed to preventing disfavored speech.
Subtype 4.1: Prohibit displaying symbols of hate or bias
Laws in this subtype prohibit actions even more specific than the laws in the subtypes prohibiting intimidation or harassment hate-crimes. The statutes list highly
specific acts and sometimes apply only if that act is taken
against a victim who has one particular characteristic.
The most general form of this kind of law can be
found in North Carolina. A state statute prohibits placing
an object or exhibit to intimidate another person: "it shall
be unlawful for any person to place or cause to be placed
anywhere in this State any exhibit of any kind whatsoever .
.. with the intention of intimidating any person or persons,
or of preventing them from doing any act which is lawful,

such as a noose. No bias motivation is required to violate
this law.
A subsection of a statute in Washington shows how
narrow this type of statute can be. The state has a more
general hate-crime statute, making it a crime to "maliciously and intentionally" cause physical injury to a person, damage property or threaten a person because of the
defendant's perception of the victim's characteristics. However, a subsection of that law explicitly states that this statute applies if the defendant "burns a cross on property of a
victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African
American heritage" or "defaces property of a victim who
is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by
defacing the property with a swastika." 73
This subsection makes Washington's statute notable,
because these two acts stand apart from all of the other
actions that might constitute a violation of this statute.
The state singled out these two acts to permit a shift in
the burden of proof. In any case involving cross burning
or swastika branding, "the trier of fact may infer that the
person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of
victims because of the person's perception of the victim's
[characteristics]." This shifts a part of the burden of proof
on the element of malicious intent. As of yet, this provision shifting the burden of proof has not been constitutionally challenged, but it seems unlikely that shifting the
burden of proof on an element of the crime to a criminal
defendant will withstand constitutional scrutiny.74

36

37

CRIMINALIZING HATE

EXPLAINING TYPES O F HAT E CRIM E S

Subtype 4.2: Desecration
The final type of hate-crime statute is desecration,

within the place of worship or within the grounds upon
which the place of worship is located, or any other object

sometimes referred to as institutional vandalism. Desecration statutes generally protect against defacement or
destruction of venerated objects. These objects include
cemeteries, flags, and places of worship, and sometimes
other things as well. We include desecration statutes because the harm that they protect against is usually closely

of reverence or sacred devotion." 78 No bias motivation is
necessary to commit this crime.
Illinois' desecration statute is one of the few requiring
a bias motivation. The institutional vandalism statute is
violated if the person "knowingly and without consent inflicts damage to . . . a church, synagogue, mosque, or other

related to a group's shared and central characteristic,
such as religion . Crimes against venerated objects are

building, structure or place used for religious worship or
other religious purpose ... a cemetery, mortuary or other

often intended to harass, annoy, or intimidate people
with that characteristic. Note, however, that these laws
almost never require proof of bias or hate against the
group the desecration harms.75 These statutes usually
make it a new crime to harm these protected objects for
any reason. States without general hate or bias laws often

facility used for the purpose of burial or memorializing
the dead" or grounds adjacent to those places and owned
or rented by them, or any personal property contained in
those places. 79 What distinguishes Illinois' statute is that
the crime must be motivated "by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, creed, religion or national origin of

still have a desecration statute.
One such jurisdiction is Arkansas, which has two desecration statutes but no hate- or bias-related criminal stat-

another individual or group of individuals, regardless of
the existence of any other motivating factor or factors."
Desecration elements can also be used to redefine
other crimes. South Carolina, for example, applies desecration language to its arson statute, in addition to having a standard desecration statute. The state's arson statute declares that causing an explosion or fire in a "church
or place of worship" is a higher level of arson than simply

ute. One of its statutes prohibits desecrating any place of
worship or burial.7~ The other prohibits desecrating any religious symbol that is an object of respect by at least a substantial segment of the public "with the purpose to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm."n
Ohio has a more specific desecration statute. The
statute reads that "no person, without privilege to do so,
shall purposely deface, damage, pollute, or otherwise
physically mistreat" any cemetery, or any place of worship, its furnishings, or religious artifacts or sacred texts

setting fire to a building. 80
Finally, desecration laws often authorize collateral punishments. These collateral punishments are often contained
within the desecration law itself, though they are sometimes found in a separate statute referring directly to the
desecration law. Pennsylvania has a typical desecration
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statute titled "Institutional Vandalism." The statute prohibits, among other things, vandalizing, defacing, or
damaging a "church, synagogue or other facility or place
used for religious worship or other religious purposes ...
[a] cemetery, mortuary or other facility used for the purpose of burial or memorializing the dead ... the grounds
adjacent to and owned or occupied by [the above mentioned places] .. . [and] any personal property located in
[the above mentioned places]." 81 A provision elsewhere in
the criminal code, declares that a person convicted of institutional vandalism "who in the opinion of the sentencing court would benefit, shall be sentenced to a term of
supervised community service, including repairing or restoring damaged property."8 2

VI: GENERAL ISSUES WHEN
ENCOUNTERING HATE OR BIAS CRIMES

Hate or bias-crime statutes are often confusing, making
it difficult to know whether a hate crime even applies to a
particular fact pattern, let alone what its implications
might be. Many of the statutes are worded so broadly
that the hate-crime law could apply to seemingly ridiculous situations where obviously no "hate" exists. The
financial crime prosecutions in Queens, New York, where
defendants targeted elderly victims but obviously held no
animus or hatred toward the elderly seems like a misapplication of a hate crime, yet the law was still effectively
used by prosecutors.
40
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Questions about how broad the application of hatecrime statute can be are often not answered by even the
legislative history. In Ca lifornia, for exa mple, a state senator posed various questions about the hate-crime statutes
to the California Attorney General because there was no
other way to determine the scope of the state's hate-crime
laws. One of his questions was about the type of fact pattern in Queens, where a victim was chosen for utilitarian
means (because the victim was more vulnerable). 83 The
California Attorney General decided that choosing a victim
for utilitarian purposes was not a hate crime, but the answer to the question was not contained in any of the statutes or legislative history of California's hate-crime statutes. The Attorney General himself needed to consult law
dictionaries and other sources in an effort to construe on
his own the meaning of various terms of the statutes.
Almost every state's hate-crime laws are prone to confusion. Finding the hate-crime law can be a cha llenge in itself. 84 The laws are often either buried in a laundry list
statute with other regulations unrelated to bias-motivated
acts, or must be pieced together using multiple statutes. 85
What facts the statute can apply to is almost never clea r,
especially when the statutes are broad. Laws like those in
New York and California, outlawing " bias," can lead to
the criminalization of a huge range of acts. The legislature
in a particular state might call a particular law a "hatecrime" law, but the actual language of the statute creates a
possibility that the law will apply when no "hate" exists at
all. These questions of application are often not answered
by the statute.
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CONCLUSION

Who makes the determination about whether a hatecrime law applies, and when that decision should be made,
are also unclear. The subtypes of laws that establish new,
separate hate crimes, or increase the degree of the crime,
always give prosecutors discretion to decide because the
maximum possible sentence is increased. 86 The question
of when the decision to apply a hate-crime statute takes
place becomes murkier with aggravating factors and sentencing enhancements. The statutes almost never say
whether the prosecutor needs to specifically point out that
the facts raise the inference of a hate motive, or whether
the judge can decide on his own that hate was a factor.
The statutes also are silent on whether the prosecutor
needs to arraign the defendant in a way that brings up the
hate motive or whether the prosecutor can just bring up
facts about the hate motive later on at trial or sentencing.
Some state judiciaries and legislatures have specifically answered these questions, while others have not.
What particular characteristics are protected seems
unproblematic, but we believe that this is an area ripe for
litigation. Almost all hate-crime statutes list the particular characteristics that trigger the hate crime law. These
lists seem comprehensive. However, the sheer breadth of
some of the statutes suggests that many state legislatures
intended to combat all hate-based crimes. An ambitious
argument would be that the failure to include a particular
characteristic in the text of the statute does not mean that
the legislature did not care about bias crimes against people with that particular characteristic. The existence of a
list could just represent that the legislature wanted merely

to provide examples of what characteristics were protected and what were not, not to the exclusion of all nonlisted characteristics. This argument could arise in regard
to crimes against people with characteristics defendants
might view negatively, but which are almost never listed
in hate crime laws, such as obesity.
Broad laws prohibiting crimes motivated by a person's
characteristics, as opposed to laws which specifically state
that they apply to crimes motivated by the victim's characteristics, can theoretically be applied in ways most people would consider odd. These laws are usually worded in
this way to allow prosecutions of crimes motivated by bias
against people the victim associates with. For example, if
a non-Indian victim who associates with Indians is attacked for that reason by a defendant who hates Indians,
a broadly written law can apply. A narrower hate-crime
law addressing bias against only the victim's characteristics would not be usable in that situation. However, these
broad laws also make possible the somewhat ridiculous
hypotheticals, discussed earlier, in which the victim had
no connection whatsoever to the defendant's bias.

Hate-crime legislation comes in a huge variety of forms.
Legislatures adjust their hate- crime statutes frequently in
an attempt to stay in step with constantly evolving social
norms. States approach the issue with different goals and
in different social climates, and hate-crime statutes reflect
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the diversity of American social norms. Furthermore, one
highly publicized event might spur a particular state to
update or modify its hate-crime law.
We classify hate crime laws into four categories creation of a new crime, sentence enhancement, sentence enhancement with aggravating factors, and narrow hate-related acts - and each category has potential opportunities
and traps.
The charts at pp. 50ff. should provide a useful guide
for practitioners, scholars, and others. The first chart
cites and summarizes all of the current hate-crime statutes in the United States, jurisdiction by jurisdiction. The
second chart provides information on what particular
characteristics are protected by each jurisdiction's law.
While these summaries are useful guides, reading the
statutes themselves is often the best way to understand
how a legislature has decided to address this complex
issue. All criminal statutes are publically available, and
can usually be found simply by entering the law's citation
into an Internet search engine. We encourage you to investigate these laws yourself. Hate crime is an area of statutory law that is changing and evolving like few others,
and is rich with interesting history and legislative intent.
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www.cahro.org/html/origin _of_ hate_laws. html .
18 u.s.c. § 245( b)(2) (1968).
2.
3. H ate Crimes Preventio n Act of 1999: Test imony on H .R. 1082
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15. For example, the Utah hate crime statute applies if the offense is
" likely to incite community unrest or cause members of the community to reasonably fear for their physical safety or to freely
exercise or enjoy any right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Utah
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case in Washington. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn .2d 303 (2007). This
seems to create a conflict between due process and the presumption
of "intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims
because of the person's perception of the victim's [characteristics] ."
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AMERICA'S HATE CRIME LAWS:
A SYNOPSIS
JURISDICTION
Fede ml

I

II Al E-CIU/\11: Sl Al UTES

use §

249 (2009) - new c rime; proh ibits
• 18
ca using bodi ly inj u ry, or a ttempting ro cause
bodil y injury while using va rio us weapons,
because of vic tim's ac tu a l o r perce ived
c haracteristics (Subtype 1.2)
• 18 U.S.C. S 247 (2009)- prohibits desecrarion
o f religious pro pert y o r interfe rence with
religious prac tice (S ubt ype 1.3 a nd 4.2)
• Sentencing Guideli ne SJA J.1

Alabama

1

• Code of Ala. S 13A-5-13 (2010) - sentencing
enha ncement which imposes mandato ry

minimum for any crime which is motiva ted

by victi m's ac tual or perceived charac reri srics
(S ubt ype 2 .3)
• Code of Ala. § l JA-6-28 (20 10 ) - includes
cross burning with inrenr ro inrimid are any

person or g roup of persons (S ubt ype 4.1)
'

• Code of Ala . S 13A- 1l -12 (20 10) - includes
desec ration of a structure o r place of worship
o r burial (S ub type 4.2)
Alaska

• Alaska Stat. S 12 .55. 155 (2010)- aggrava ting
sentencing facto r if defendant direc ted rhe
conduct const ituting the offense nr a victim

because of certain victim characteristics; also
ma kes ir a n aggravating factor if defendant
knew rhe victim was pa rticula rly vu lnera ble

because of certain other victim chantcrerisrics
(S ubt ype 3.1)
• Alaska Star. S 11.76 .110 (20 10) - new c rime;
prohibits interference with rights gra nted by
the cons titution or laws of rhe srare; no r
directly ried ro bias (Subtype 1.3)
Arizona

• A.R .S. S 13-70 1 (20 10 ) - aggrava ting fac to r
if c rime was convicted o ut of malice towa rd
vic tim because of victi m's ac tua l o r perceived
identity in a g roup li sted in a nother srn rure
(S ubt ype 3.1)
• A.R .S. S 41 -1750 (2010) - lists rhe gro ups rhnr
aggrava ting factor sta ture applies ro
• A.R.S. S 13-1707 (2010) - c ross burning with
intent to intimidate a ny person o r g roup of
persons (S ubt ype 4. 1)

1 ~hl' rl:Jcra l Sl'Otl'ndn~ ~u iJdim: rl'~lHJin~ h•lft.' i;rimcii is an ;1Jm ini scrativc \."UJl', 1101 •' Sl;ltU tC,
ur :ri.t1 ll has rh c dfc\.'.t of inL'.rC.':t!<!inµ du: pn.·1'umprivc sc:mcncc for any fc:dt·rnl aiml'.
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Arizona (continued)
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• A.R.S. S 13-1708 (2010) - burning any symbol
other than a cross with intent to intimidate any
person or group of persons (Subtype 4.1)

AMERI C A 'S HAT E C RIM E LAW S : A SYNOP S I S

JUlti;l>ICTION
Ca li fo rnia (co ntinu ed)

• A.R.S. S 13-1604 (2010) - includes desecration
of any building, place or personal property
used for religious purpose (Subtype 4.2)
Arkansas

• A.C .A. S 5-71-207 (2010) - disorderly conduct
statute includes desecration of religious symbols (Subtype 4.2)

• Ca l. Pen. Code § 11 70.8 (20 10) - aggra va ting
facto r if assa ult or ro bber y rook pl ace when
victim wa s in a place of worship (S ubt ype 3.2)
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 11413 (20 JO) - new crime
tha t is higher level crime than a rson, which .
includes church burning with intent to terrori ze
or disregard of terrorizing (S ubt ype 1.2)

•Cal. Pen. Code S 422.55 (2010) - list of rhe
protected characteristics
• Cal. Pen. Code S 422 .56 (2010) - defines terms
used in the state's hare crime statutes

• Ca l. Pen. Code S 114·11 (2010) - includes placing
symbols of hare, such as a noose or swastika ,
with the intent to terrorize another (Subtype 4. 1)

• Cal. Pen . Code S 422 .6 (2010) - new crime
prohibiting harmful act against person or
property, committed ro interfere with victim's
rights, done in whole or in part because of
the actual or perceived characteristics of the
victim; mandatory community service for
violations of this crime (Subtypes 1.3 and 2.4)

• Ca l. Pen. Code S ll41 2 (201 0)- new c rime of
interference with a norher's religious exercise
(Subt ype l. 3)
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 302 (2010) - prohibits
di sturbing, in certa in ways, assemblies fo r
religious worship (Subt ype 1. 3)

• Cal. Pen . Code S 422 .7 (2010) - sentencing
enhancement that increases potential incarceration for any harmful act against person of
property to interfere with rights, where the act
is not covered under Section 422.6; makes
crimes that are not punishable by imprisonment
punishable by imprisonment of up to one year
(Subtype 2 .3)
• Cal. Pen . Code S 422 .75 (2010) - sentencing
enhancement, adds additional years of incarcerarion for felonies that are hate crimes; also
adds additional years for prior felony convictions which the trier of fact determined were
hate crimes (Subtype 2 .3)
• Cal. Pen. Code 423 .2 (2010) - prohibits interfering with specific civil rights (Subtype 1.3)

• Ca l. Pen. Code § 42 2.77 (2010) - judge has
disc retion to ord er defend ant convicted of a
lun e crime to perfo rm community service
(S ubt ype 2.3 )
• Cal. Pen. Code § 422 .85 (20 10) - judge has
di sc retion ro ord er defenda nt convicred of a
hare crime to complete sensiti vi ty cl ass a nd /o r
pay res titurion payments (S ubt ype 2.3)

• A.C .A. S 5-71-215 (2010) - includes desecration of places of worship and cemeteries
(Subtype 4.2)
California

I HATE-CRL\1E STATU I ES

• Cal. Pen. Code S 594.3 (20 10)- pro hibits
desec ration of places of religious w~rs h i p a nd
of cemeteries; increases degree of crune if
committed with intent to deter others from
ex pressi ng religious beliefs (Subt ype 4.2)
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 3053. 4 (20 10) - allows fo r
collateral punishments ro be required of a hare
c rime defend a nt when rh"' defend ant IS paro led
(Subt ype 2. 3)
Colorado

• C. R.. 18-9- 12 1 (20 10)- new crime which
prohibits cau sing in jur y, p~ope rr y damage
o r placing a nother person in fea r of person
or properr y damage, wh ere ac t w as ra ke_n .
with intent ro intimidate or harass rhe v1cnm

beca use of victim 's actua l or perceived
cha racteristic (Subrype 1. 2)

• Cal. Pen. Code S 190.03 (2010) - requires
that a defendant convicted of first-degree
murder that is a hate crime be sentenced to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole
(Subtype 2.4)

• C. R.S. 18-9- 12 1(3.5) - aurh orizes community
service or a lrernari ve d ispute resolution for
defenda nts convicted of firsr hare crime
(Subtype 2.4)

•Cal. Pen. Code S 422 .76 (2010) - court can use
fact that felony is a hate crime as an aggravating
factor if Section 422.76 is not used (Subtype 3.1)

• C. R.S . 18-9- 1I3 (2010)- includ es desecration
of venerared objecrs, places of worship a nd
pl aces of buria l (S ubt ype 4.2)
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Connecticut
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• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-181j (2010) - new crime
which prohibits causing physical injury to victim
because of victim's characteristics, with specific
intent to intimidate or harass (Subtype 1.2)

AMERICA 'S HATE CRIME LAWS: A SYNOPSIS

Jl J{J,J>J( 110,
District of Columbia
(co ntinued)

•Conn. Gen . Stat. S 53a-181k (2010) new crime which prohibits causing physica l
contact with victim, damaging victim's property
or threatening to physically contact victim or
damage victim's property, because of victim's
characteristics and with specific intent to
intimidate or harass (Subtype 1.2)

• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(b) (2010) - includes
desecration of religious objects or symbols,
places of worship and cemeteries (Subtype 4.2)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(c)-(d) (2010) prohibits cross burning (Subtype 4.1)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(d) (2010) - prohibits
placing a noose with the intent to intimidate or
harass based on the target's characteristics
(Subtype 4.1 )
• Conn . Gen. Stat. S 53a-40a (2010) - sentencing enhancement which increases degree of
certain bias related crimes if the defendant has
previously been convicted of a bias related
crime (Subtype 2.2)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53-37a (2010) - new crime
prohibiting violating any provision of Section
46a-58 while wearing a hood or mask , with
intent to deprive target or victim of rights
because of victim's characteristics (Subtype
1.3)

• Conn. Gen . Stat. S 54-56e(c) (2010) - prohibits
diverting defendants charged with hate crimes
into an accelerated pretrial rehabi litation
program (Subtype 2.4)
District of Columbia

• D.C . Code S 22-3703 (2010) - sentencing
en hancement for bias related designated acts,
as defined in Section 22-3701; maximum fine
and maximum incarceration both increased by
1-~ times the normal maximum (Subtype 2.3)

54

11 \I I .( JU\ 1f ' I \I l ' I I '>

• D.C. Code § 22-3701 (2010) - defines bias
related crime as a designated act that demonstrates a defendant's prejudice based on the
actual or perceived characteristics of the
victim; defines designated act as an extensive
list of crimes against person or property
• D.C . Code S 22-3312.03 (2010) - prohibits
wearing a hood or mask in public places or
when holding a meeting with the intent to
intimidate, harass, cause fear or interfere with
the rights of a person (Subtype 1.3)
• D.C. Code S 22-3312.02 (2010) - includes a
prohibition against damaging any symbol used
for religious or burial services, or_ us_ed by peopie sharing a particular charac_temncs; one
prohibited intent is related to rnnm1danon or
interference with rights (Subtype 4.1)

• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-181l (2010) new crime prohibiting damaging any property
with intent to harass another person , because
of that person's characteristics (Subtype 1.2)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(a) (2010) new crime which prohibits interfering with
victim's rights because of the victim's characteristics (Subtype 1.3)

J

Delaware

• 11 Del. C . § 1304(a)(l) (2010) - sentencing
enhancement if any substantive crime was
committed to interfere with the victim's rights
increases the level of the underlying crime for
a ll but the most serious felonies ; for most
serious felonies, the minimum sentence of
imprisonment is doubled (Subtype 2.3)
• 11 Del. C. S 1304(a)(2) (2010) - s~nte~cing
enhancement if any substannve crime 1s
committed where the victim was selected
because of the victim's characteristics; increases
the level of the underlying crime for all but the
most serious felonies; for most serious felonies,
the minimum sentence of imprisonment is
doubled (Subtype 2.1 and 2.3)
• 11 Del. C. S 1301 (2010) - new c~ime pro_hibiting
congregating in a public place whde wearing
hoods, in a manner likely to deprive others of
rights (Subtype 1.3)
• 11 Del. C. S 805 (2010)- prohibits burning
religious symbols without permission of the owner
of the property where rhe sym~ol is burnt and
without advance notice to officials tn the county
where the burning is to take place (Subtype 4.1)
• 11 Del. C. S 1331 (2010) - includes desecr~tion
of places of worship and objects of veneration,
when done in a public place and ma way the actor
knows is likely to outrage observers (Subtype 4.2)
• 11 Del. C. § 4209 (2010) - lists bia~ motive and
interference with righrs as aggravating factors
when deciding whether a defendant convicted of
first-degree murder should be sentenced to death
(Subtype 2.4)
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• Fla. Srar . S 775.085 (20 10) - pena lry enha ncemenr which increases rhe degree of a ny crime
if rhe commission of rhe crime ev id ences
prej udice based on rhe charac rerisrics of rhe
vicrim (Subrype 2.1)
• Fhi. Srar. § 775 .0845 (2010) - pena lry enhancemenr which increases rhe deg ree of any crime
if rhe defend ant wore a hood or mas k while
committing rhe c rime; nor ried ro bias
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JURISDICTION
Hawa ii (co 11tim1cd)

Idah o

• Fla. Srar. § 876 .18 (2010) - prohibits burning
a cross on private propert y wi th out rhe ow ner's

Illin ois

• Fla . Srar. S 775.0861 (2010) - pena lry enh ancemenr whic h increa ses rhe deg ree of a crime
invo lving physica l force against a person if
rhe c rime wa s committed on rhe property of a
religious insrirurion whi le rhe vicrim is o n rhe
property ro attend or pa rticipa re in religiou s
services (S ubt ype 2.2)

a lso srn res rh at any non-inca rcern ri on sentence

for a hare crime convicrio n will includ e
communiry serv ice (Subr ype 2.4)
• 730 I LCS 5/5-5-3.2 (20 10) - aggrava ting facror
if defendanr commirred an offense by reason
of the ac rua l or perceived characrerisrics of rhe
victim, an associate or friend of rhe vi~ rim , o r ~
relarive of rhe vicrim; for age a nd physica l hand1cap, no bias morive is necessary (Subrype 3. 1)

• O.C .G .A. S 17-10-18 (2010) - define s when
no tice of prosecuroria l inren r ro seek enha nced
penalry mu sr be given

• 720 JLCS 5/21-1.2 (2010)- includes desecration
of places of wors hip, cemeteries o r places used
ro memo rialize rhe dead, by reason of rhe
ac rua l or perceived characrerisrics of a person
or gro up of people (S ubrype 4.2)

• O .C.G .A. § 16-11-37 (2010) - prohibits
burning a sy mbol wirh an inrenr ro rerro rize
(Subt ype 4.1)

Hawaii

•HRS S 706-662 (2010) - senrencing enha ncemenr aurhorized if rhe defendanr inrenriona lly
selecred rhe vicrim or rhe properry damaged
because of hosriliry roward rhe ac ru a l o r
perceived characre risrics of a ny pe rson;
felonie s on ly (S ubt ype 2.1)
•HR S S 706-661 (2010) - defi nes what the

inc reased maxi mum sentences are if rhe sentenc·
ing enhancemenr from Secrion 706-662 applies
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• 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1 (2010)- new crime of
commitring one of a number of subsranrive c rin~es
beca use of rhe ac rua l or perceived characremncs
of an individua l or gro up of individual s; crime
ca n be of a grearer degree if defendanr is convicred
of rhis srarure afrer previously being convicred
of ir or because rhe crime was commirred in a
plac~ of worship o r place of buria l (Subtype 1. 2)
• 720 ILCS 5/12-7.l(b- !O) (2010) - penalry
enhancement for viol:uion of hare cri me srnrure
which mandares eirher a fine o r resriruri on;

• O.C .G.A. § 17-10-17 (2010) - aggravnring fac ror
if rhe rrier of facr derermines rhar rhc defendanr
selecred victim or vicrim's properry beca use
of bias or prejudice; srarure is worded like a
senrencing enhancemenr, bur does no r allow
sentences beyond rhe normal srarurory maximum for an underlying offense (Subrype 3.1)

• O.C.G.A. S 16 -7-26 (2010) - desecrario n of
places of wo rship (S ubr ype 4.2)

•Idaho Code § 18-7902 (20 10) - new crime
prohibiting causing physical injury or damaging/
defacing a ny person's property, or threaten ing ro
injure or damage, in order ro inrimidare or hara ss
rhe victim because of the victim's charncrerisrics;
defines "deface" ro include placi ng symbols like
burning crosses (Subtype 1. 2 and 4.1)
•I daho Code § 18-7903 (2010) - defines pena lr y
for violari ons of Sec ri on 18-7902

permission (Subtype 4.1)

Georgi;1

• HR S § 846-51 (2010) - defines rerm s used in
the state's hate crime sta tures
• HRS § 71 1-1107 (2010) - includes desecrarion
of a place of worsh ip or buria l, o r of a an
o bjecr of venerarion (S ubt ype 4.2)

• Fla. Srar. § 876 .17 (2010) - prohibits burning
a cross in a public place (S ubrype 4 .1)

•Fla. Srar. § 806.13 (2010) - includes clesecra rion
of any place of worship o r religious article
conra ined in a place of worship (Su brype 4.2)

I Ht\l E-CIUME STAl Ul ES

Indiana

•Ind . Code Ann. § 35-43-1-2 (2010) - new
crime prohibirs damaging p~ope rt y if rha r
properr y is a place of worship or 1f the damage
was done ro impair rhe rig hrs of another
person (S ubrype 1.3 and 4.2)

Iowa

•I owa Code S 729A.2 (2010) - sra~u re defining
hate crime to mea n crimes com m med aga tnsr a
person or properry because of rhe victim's. .
charac rerisrics or because of rhe cha rac rensncs
of a person rhe vicrim associates with
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•Iowa Code S 712.9 (2010) - penalty enhancement which increases the degree of the arson
related crimes which are also a hate crime
under Section 729A.2 (Subtype 2 .2)

AM E RI C A'S HAT E C RIM E LAW S : A SYNOP S IS
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Lo uisiana

rh e victim's actu al or perceived association
with an organization (Subtype 2 .3)
•La. R.S . 14 .225 (2 010 ) - includes desecration
of places of worship and places used to bury
or memoria lize the dead (Subt ype 4 .2)
Ma ine

•I owa Code S 708 .2C (2010) - new crimes of
assault in violation of individual rights
(Subtype 1.3)

• K.S .A. § 21-4716 (2009) - aggravating factor
if victim was selected or offense was motivated
because of the characteristics of the victim,
whether or not the victim actually had the
characteristic; if found, judge can depart
from presumptive sentence set by sentencing
guidelines (Subtype 3.1)
• K.S.A. S 21-4003 (2009) - new crime of denial
of civil rights to another based on the other's
characteristics (Subtype 1.3)
• K.S .A. S 21-4111 (2009) - includes desecration
of any place of worship or place of burial
(Subtype 4.2)

Kentuck y

• KRS S 532.031 (2010) - aggravating factor
if defendant committed specific crimes intentionally because of the characteristics of
another individual or group of individuals
(Subtype 3.2)
• KRS S 525.113 (2010) - desecration of any
object defined in Section 525.110, because of
the characteristics of another individual or
group of individuals (Subtype 4 .2)
• KRS S 525.110 (2010) - objects include places
of worship and religious symbols
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• 17 M .R.S. § 293 1 (2 010 ) - new crime
prohibiting interfering with the rights of
a nother person (S ubt ype 1.3)
• 17 M .R. S. § 2932 (2010) - sets penalty for
viol:ition of Section 17-2 931

•I owa Code S 729.5 (2010) - new crime of acting or conspiring to interfere with another
person's rights, or gathering to teach methods
of interfering with rights; no bias required
(Subtype 1.3)
Ka nsas

•La. R.S. 14:107.2 (2010 ) - sentencing enhancemenr fo r extensive li st of substantive offen ses
which add s additiona l incarceration time
a nd fin es if victim was selec ted becau se of the
vic tim 's ac tua l o r perceived cha rac teristics or

• Iowa Code S 716 .6A (2010) - penalry enhancement which increases the degree of vandalism
crimes which are also a hate crime under
Section 729A .2 (Subtype 2.2)
• Iowa Code S 716.8 (2010) - penalty enhancement which increases the degree of trespass if
the trespass is done with the intent to commit a
hate crime under Section 729A.2 (Subtype 2 .2)

I HATE -CRIME STATUTES

• 5 M . R.S. § 4684-A (2010 ) - establishes right
to be free of violence, propert y damage or
tres pass motivated by cha racterisrics; specifi ca lly refe rs to Section 17-293 1
• I7-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2010 )- aggravating
factor if selection of the person or properr y
was because of the cha racteristics of the victim
(Subtype 3 .1 )
• 17-A M.R.S. § 507 (20 10)- includes desec ration
of any place of worship or buria l (Subtype 4.2)
Maryla nd

•Md . CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann . § 10-306
(2010) - states th at violations of Se_c tions
10-3 02 through '10 -3 06 a re new cnmes, a nd
sets the pena lties for violating rhose statutes
•Md . CRIMI NAL LAW Code Ann . S W-3 07
(2010) - permits the pena lty for violanons of
Sec tions 10-302 through 10-306 to run consecutively with other crimes based_on the act that
led to the violation of th nr secn on
• Md . CRIMI NAL LAW Code Ann. S 10-3 01
(2010) - defines the characteri stics used for rhe
s tate's bia s crime statures

•Md . CRIMINA L LAW Code Ann . S 10-3 04
(2010) - new crime if defend ant commirs or
attempts ro commit a ny c rime aga inst or

damages th e property of a person becm~se of
the person's cha racteristics; pr~pe rty cnmes
based on ownership by the v1crim (Subtype 1.1 )
• Md . CRIMINAL LAW Cod e Ann . S 10 -3 05
(20 I0) - new crime prohibiting propert y cn_mes
ba sed on the characteristics of people assoc•ated wirh the pro perry (Subtype 1.1 )
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• Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. S 10-303
(2010) - new crime prohibiting obstructing
another person from the free exercise of that
person's religious beliefs (Subtype 1.3)
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M ississippi

• Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. § 10-302
(2010) - includes desecration of a place of
worship or cemetery (Subtype 4.2)
Massachusetts

• ALM GL ch . 265, S 39 (2010) - new crime of
committing an assault or battery, or damaging
a person's property, with the intent to intimidate the victim, because of the victim's
characteristics; allows judge to order restitution for property damage; requires that a
conviction resu lt in the defendant paying an
additiona l fine and completing a diversity
program (Subtype 1.2 and 2.4)

• Miss . Code Ann. § 99 -19-351 (2010) penalty enhancement for any felony or
misdemeanor if the crime was committed
against a victim who is over sixty-five years
old or who is disabled (Subtype 2 .3)
• Miss. Code Ann . S 99-19-357 (2010) authorizes additional penalty if Section 99-19-35 7
applies , which is a term of imprisonment up to
twice the normal maximum and a fine up to
twice the normal maximum

• MCL S 750 .147b (2010) - new crime of
causing physical contact with a person or
damaging the property of a person, or threatening to cause physical contact or damage
property, because of that person's characteristics, and with specific intent to intimidate or
harass (Subtype 1.2)

• Minn. Stat. S 609.595 (2009) - sentencing
enhancement which increases level of the crime
for property crimes committed because of the
victim's or another's actua l or perceived characteristics (Subtype 2 .2)
• Minn. Stat. S 609.2231 (2009) - sentencing
enhancement which increases level of the crime
for assaults committed because of the victim's
or another's actual or perceived characteristics; additional increase for two such assaults
within five years of each ocher (Subtype 2.2)
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• Miss. Code An n. § 99 -19-303 (2010) sets procedure for seek ing enhanced penalties
under the hate crime statutes

• ALM GL ch . 266, S 98 (2010) - includes
desecration of a place used for religious
instruction (Subtype 4.2)

• Minn. Stat. S 609.749 (2009) - sentencing
enhancement which increases level of the crime
for harassment or stalking committed because
of the victim's or another's actual or perceived
characteristics (Subtype 2.2)

r-<

• Miss . Code Ann. § 99-19-307 (2010) authorizes additional penalty if Section
99-19 -301 applies, which is a term of imprisonment up to twice the normal maximum and a
fine up to twice the norma l maximum

• ALM GL ch. 266, S 127A (2010) - includes
desecration of a place of worship or a place for
burial or memoria lizing the dead (Subtype 4.2)

Minnesota

11 \I

• Miss. Code Ann . S 99-19-301 (2010) - penalty
enhancement for felony or misdemeanor if the
crime was committed because of the actual
or perceived characteristics of the victim
(Subtype 2.3)
•Miss. Code Ann . S 99 -19-305 (2010) sets procedure and specific elements which
much be used by the trier of fact when deciding
whether a crime was committed because of the
actual or perceived characteristics of the victim

• ALM GL ch . 265, S 37 (2010) - new crime of
interference with rights; bias not required
(Subtype 1.3)

Michigan

j

•Miss. Code Ann . S 97-17-39 (2010) - includes
desecration of items or places used to bury or
memorialize the dead , any items inside a place
of worship, or any part of the property in these
places (Subtype 4.2)
• Miss. Code Ann S 97-25-17 (2010) - prohibits
disturbing a congregation of people who are
assembled for religious worship (Subtype 1.3)
Missouri

• S 557.035

R.S.Mo. (2010) - sentencing
enhancement which increases the level of specific crimes which are knowingly motivated
because of the characteristics of the victim or
victims; the underlying offense is charged
under this stature, so the statutory language
make this seem like a new crime (Subtype 2.2)

• S 574.085

R.S.Mo. (2010) - includes desecration of a place of worship or a place used co
bury or memorialize the dead , or ground s
adjacent to and owned and rented by one
of those places (Subtype 4.2)
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• Mont. Code Anno., § 45-5-222 (2010) sentencing enhancement which adds additiona l
yea rs incarceration to a lmost every crime if the
cr ime was because of the victim's characteri srics (Subtype 2 .3)

AMERICA'S HA TE CR IM E LAWS: A SYNOPSIS
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• RSA 65 1:6 (20 10) - penalry enha ncement
increasing the possible incarceration sentences
if the defend a nt was substa ntia ll y motivared ro
commit the crime beca use of hostility towa rd
the victi m's charac teristics; also has enhancement for crimes involving force against a person
or financial theft where the defendant intend ed
ro rake adva ntage of the victim 's vu lnerab ility
due to age or disa bility (S ubt ype 2.3)

New jersey

• N.j. Stat. § 2C:16-l (2010) - new crime prohibiring the commission of an extensive li sr of underlying offenses with rhe purpose to intimidare,
or knowmg rhar it would inrimid are, or which
ca used the intimid ation of rhe vic tim , beca use
of the victim 's characterisrics; a llows inference
rhar defendant selecting victim because of charac teri srics meant tha t defendant in tended to
intimidate victim because of characteristics; a llows
judge to impose collateral penalties such as diversiry t raining and fines (Subt ype 1.1 and 2 .3)

• Mont. Code Anno., S 46-1-401 (2010) sets proced ure for determining if Section
45-5-222 applies
•M ont . Code An no., § 45-5-221 (2010) new crime of causing bodi ly injury or causing
apprehension of bodily injury, or da magi ng or
defacing pro perty, because of a person's characteristics and with intent to terrify, intimid ate,
threaten, harass, annoy or offend ; deface
includes placing a symbol of hare like a burning cross (Subtype 1.2 and 4.1)
Nebraska

• R. R.S . Neb. § 28-111 (2010)- sentencing
enha ncement which increases the level of crime
for specific c rimes committed aga inst a person
or a person's pro pert y because of that person's
clrnracrerisrics; excludes the highest level
crimes (Subt ype 2.2)

• N.J. Srar. S 2C:33-l 1 (2010) - new crime of
placing a symbol on a variety of places rhar
exposes others to a threat of violence; allows judge
to impose collatera l penalties such as restitution
and community serv ice (Subtype 4.1 a nd 2.4)

• R.R .S. Neb. § 28-115 (20'IO) - sentenc ing
en hancement which increases rhe leve l of crime
fo r specific crimes commirred aga inst a person
because that person is a pregnant woman;
exclud es the highest level crimes (Subt ype 2.2)
• R.R.S. Neb. § 28-110 (2010) - esra blishes
person's right ro be free of crimes committed
because of his or her charac teristics

Nevada

I Ht\TE-CIUl\IE STt\TlJl ES

New Ha mpshi re

• N .J . Srar. S 2C:33-9 (2010) - includes desecrarion of any symbol or place of wo rship, or of
any place of buria l (Subt ype 4 .2)

• R.R.S. Neb. S 28-112 (2010) - sers procedures
for alleging and proving bi as crimes

• N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-186-2 (2010) - defines
crimes "motivated by hare" as the intent to
comm it a c rime because of rhe acrua l or
perceived characteristics of rhe victim, as well
as rhe mea ning of certain characterisrics

• Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann . S 193.1675 (2010) sentencing enhancement which adds additiona l
incarceration rime for spec ific crimes commirred
because rhe acru a l or perceived characteristics
of rhe victim was different than rhar characteristic of the perpetrator (Subtype 2.4)

• N .M. Star. Ann. § 31 -18B-3 (2010) - sentencing
en hancemenr which add addiriona l years incarcerarion for felonies morivared by hare, and
a llows co llatera l penalties such as community
service and ed uca tion fo r both felonies and
misdemeanors motivated by hare (S ub type 2.3)

• Nev. Rev. Star. Ann. § 207.185 (2010) new crime prohibiting violating any provisio n
of spec ific crimes by reason of rhe actu a l or
perceived charac teristics of another person
or group of peop le (Subt ype 1.2)

• N.M. Star. Ann. S 31 -ISB-4 (2010) - prohibits
desecration of a church; has been interpreted ro
mean a ny place of worship (Su btype 4.2)

• Nev. Rev. Sntt. Ann. S 206 .125 (2010)includes desecration of any place of worship
or place of burial or memoria li zing the dead,
or of the ground s adjacent ro a nd ow ned or
rented by a ny of those places (Subtype 4.2)
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New Mexico

New York

.

Y CLS Penal S 485.05 (2010) - defines
committing a hare crime as commirring a n
incredibly ex tensive list of substa ntive offenses
and in tentionally selecting the victim , or com·
mitring the act or ac rs, in whole or substa ntia l
part because of a belief or perception regarding
the characrerisrics of a person, regardless of
whether the belief or perception is correct
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• NY CLS Penal S 485 .10 (2010) - sentencing
en hancement which increases the level of the
underlying crime if it is a hare crime for a ll
but the most serious felonies; for the serious
felonies, increases the incarceration time
(Subtype 2 .1 and 2.3)

JUIUSDIC I ION

North Caro lina
(co 11ti11ued )

•NY CLS Penal S 240.30 (2010) - new crime
which includes causing physical contact with a
person, with intent harass, annoy, threaten or
alarm, because of a belief or perception about
that person's characteristics; is a higher level
of harassment (Subtype 1.2)

11,\ I E-CRl 1\\E SL\ l U I 1.S

• N .C. Gen Star.§ 14-12. 14 (2010) - prohibits
placing an intimidating symbol, whi le wearing
a mask or hood , with rhe intention of intimidaring a person or people, or to prevent them
from doing something h1wful or ro force rhem
ro do something unlawful (Subtype 4.1)
• N .C. Gen. Star. S 14- 144 (2010) - includ es
ha rming ;1 church or graveyard in a way other
than burning (S ubtype 4.2)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-62.2 (2010) - prohibits
burning a place of worsh ip (Subtype 4.2)

•NY CLS Penal S 240.31(2) (2010) - new crime
wh ich includes causing physical contact with a
person , with intent harass, a nnoy, threaten or
alarm, because of a belief or perception about
thar person's cha racteristics, when defendant
has been previously convicted of doing the
same within a set a mount of time; is a higher
level of harassment (Subtype 1.2)

•

.C. Gen. Star. § 14-49 (20 10) - includes using
an ex plosive to harm a place of worship; higher
level crime tha n church burning (Subtype 4.2)

•

.C. Gen. Star.§ 14-12. 12 (20 10)- prohibits
placing a burning cross on public property or
with the intent ro intimidate or coerce a person
(Subtype 4.1)

•NY CLS Penal S 240.70 (2010) - prohibits
inrerfering with another's right to religious
worship (Subrype 1.3)

• N.C. Gen. Star. § 14-199 (2010) - prohibits
obstructing path ro a place of religious worship
(S ubtype 1.3)

•NY CLS Penal S 240.71 (2010) - prohibits
interfering with another's right to religious
worship, when defendant has been previously
convicted of doing the same within a set
amou nt of time (Subtype 1.3)

North Dakota

• NY CLS Civ. R. S 40-c (2010) - establishes
right to be free of hare crimes

with a person beca use of th at person 's characreristics because the person has been, or ro
keep the person from , usi ng a faci lity open
to rhe publ ic (Subtype 1.3)
• N.D. Cent. Code, § 12 .1-14-05 (2010)new crime of interfering with a person's c ivil
righrs; bias nor required (Subtype 1.3)
Ohio

• N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-401.14 (2010) - new crime
of assaulting a person, damaging property, or
threatening to assault or damage, because of
the victim's characteristics; also prohibits
reaching methods to accomplish this crime
(Subtype 1.2)
• N.C . Gen. Stat. S 14-3 (2010) - penalty
enhancement which increases the level of crime
for any misdemeanor committed because of the
victim's characteristics (Subtype 2.1)
• N .C. Gen Stat. S 14-12.13 (2010) - proh ibits
placing an intimidating symbol, with the intenrion of intimidating a person or people, or ro
prevent them from doing something lawful or
to force them to do something unlawful
(Subtype 4.1)
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• N.D. Cent. Code, § 12.2-14-04 (2010)new c rime ro injure , intimidate or inte rfe re

• NY CLS Penal S 240.31 (2010) - prohibits desecrarion of a place of worship, cross burning, and
placing symbols of hare (Subtype 4.1 and 4.2)

North Carolina

J

• ORC Ann . 2927.12 (2010) - new crime
prohibiting committing one of a short list of
crimes beca use of the clrnracreristics of another
person or group of people (Subtype 1.1)
• O RC Ann . 2927.11 (2010)- includes desecration
of a place of worship, cemetery, or of an object
of reverence or devotion (Subtype 4.2)

Oklahoma

• 21 Oki. Sr. § 850 (2010) - new crime prohibiting
assaulting a person , damaging property, or
threatening to assa ult or damage, maliciously
a nd with the specific intent ro intimid ate or
harass another person because of that person's
characrerisr ics; also prohibits inciting im minent violence against a person because of that
person's charac teristics (Subtype 1.2)
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• 21 Oki. Sr. § 1174 (2010) - prohibits cross
burning with the intent to intimidate any
person or group of people (Subtype 4 .1)
• 21 Oki. St.§ 1765 (2010) - prohibits desecration of any house of worship and any object
used for religious worship contained within
(Subtype 4.2)
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• R.l. Gen. Laws § 11-44-31 (2010) - includes
desecration of a place of worship, or place used
for buria l or memoria lizing the dead, or the
grounds adjacent to and owned by those places
(Subtype 4.2)

South Carolina

• S.C. Code Ann. S 16-1 7-560 (2009) new crime prohibiting assaulting or intimidating
a person because the victim's politica l opinions
or because that victim exercised their rights ;
bias nor required (Subtype 1.3)

• 21 Oki. Sr. S 915 (2010) - prohibits disturbing
an assemblage of people gathered for religious
worship (Subtype 1.3)
Oregon

• S.C. Code Ann. § 16-5-10 (2009) - new crime
prohibiting two or more people conspiring or
going places with the intent ro injure, oppress
or violate the person or property of another
because of the victim's political opinions or
because that victim exercised their rights; also
prohibits interference with a person's rights;
bias nor required (Subtype l.3)

• ORS S 166.155 (2010) - new crime prohibiting
tampering with property or subjecting another
person ro physica l contact because of the
defendant's perception of the victim's characterisrics; also prohibits threatening to inflict
injury, commit a crime or damage property
which would affect rhe person threatened or
their family, because of the person's characterisrics (Subtype 1.2)

• S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-17-520 (2009) - prohibits
willful and malicious disruption of a religious
meeting (Subtype 1.3)

• ORS S 166.165 (2010) - new crime prohibiting
rwo or more people conspiring to violate
Section 166.155 (Subtype 1.2)

• S.C. Code Ann. S 16-11 -110 (2009) - places
of worship included as one of the types of
buildings damaged which would increase the
criminal degree of arson (Subtype 2.2)

• ORS S 166.075 (2010) - includes desecration
of a place of worship; must be done in a manner likely to outrage public sensibilities
(Subtype 4.2)
Pennsylvania

• 18 Pa.C.S. S 2710 (2010) - new crime of
committing specific substantive offenses with
malicious intention toward the victim or victim;
crime's level is one degree higher than the
underlying offense (Subtype 1.2)
• 18 Pa.C.S. S 3307 (2010) - includes desecration
of a place of worship, p lace for burial or
memorializing the dead, or the grounds adjacent
to and owned by those places (Subtype 4.2)
• 18 Pa.C.S. S 5509 (2010) - includes desecration
of a place of worship or burial, or of an object
of venerarion by the public (Subtype 4.2)

Rhode Island

• R.l. Gen. Laws S 12-19-38 (2010) - sentencing
enhancement which increases the incarceration
time if the victim or victim's property is
selecred because of the defendant's hatred or
animus toward the actua l or perceived characterisrics off the victim (Subtype 2.3)
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Rhode Island (continued)

• S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-11-535 (2009) - includes
damage to a place of worship, or agreeing or
conspiring to do the same (Subtype 4.2)
South Dakota

• S.D. Codified Laws S 22-198-1 (2010) - new
crime prohibiting causing physical injury to a
person, or damaging or deface a person's properry, with the specific intent to intimidate or
harass any person or specific group of people
because of rhat person's or group of people's
characteristics (Subtype I.2)
• S.D. Codified Laws§ 22-198-2 (2010) defines "deface" to include cross burning
and placing hate symbols
• S.D. Codified Laws S 22-198-4 (2010) prohibits interfering with religious practice
(Subtype I.3)
• S.D. Codified Laws S 22-19805 (2010) prohibits forcing another to adopt or practice
a particular religion (Subtype 1.3)
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• Tenn . Code Ann. S 39-17-309 (2010) establi shes right to be fre e of fear, intimid ation ,
harassment a nd bodily injury rega rdless of cerrain characteristics; interference with that right
by injuring, threatening, or damaging property
is a new crime; intending ro interfere whi le
wearing a hood or mask is also a new crime
(Subtype 1.2)

AMERICA'S HATE CR IM E LAW S: A SYNOPSIS
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Uta h (co 11ti1111ed)

• Uta h Code Ann. S 76-3-203.4 (2010) aggravating factor if offense is likely to incite
community unrest or cause members of the
community to fear for their physical sa fet y or
ro freely exercise their rights (Subt ype 3.1)

Verm ont

• 13 Y.S.A.

Secrion 39-17-309 (Subtype 3.1)

• 13 Y.S.A . S 1456 (2010) - prohibits burn ing a
cross or religious symbol, with the intent to
terrorize or harass a person or group of people
(Subt ype 4.1)

• Tenn . Code. Ann. S 39-17-311 (2010) includes desecration of a place of worship or
buria l (Subtype 4 .2)

• Tex . Penal Code Ann . § 12.47 (2010) sentenc ing enhancement whic h increases level
of c rime if a n a ffirmati ve finding under Section
42.014 of the C riminal Procedure Code was
made (Subtype 2.1)
• Tex. Penal Code Ann. S 28 .03 (2010)sentencing enhancement which increases the
degree of criminal mischief if it harmed a place
of worship or huma n buria l (Subtype 4.2)
• Tex. Penal Code Ann . § 28.08 (2010) sentencing enha ncement which increases
the deg ree of graffiti if it harmed a place of
worship or huma n burial (Su btype 4 .2)
Uta h

• Utah Code Ann . S 76-3 -203.3 (2010) sentencing enhancement which increases
rhe level of c rime for certain misdemeanor
offenses which are committed with rhe intent
to intimid ate or terrorize another person,

which would cause that person ro reasonably
fear exercising his or her rights; no bias
necessa ry (Subt ype 2.2)
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(2010) - sentencing

for a ll crimes with a maximum penalty of less
than five years if the conduct was ma liciously
motivated by the victim's ac tua l or perceived
characteristics; fo r c rimes with a maximum
penalty of five years or more, rhe ma licious
motivation serves as an aggravating sentenc ing
factor (S ubt ype 2 .1 and 3.1)

charac teristics are more expansive than in

• Tex. Code Crim . Proc. Ann. art . S 42.014
(2010) - sentencing enhancement that a llows
collatera l pena lty of attendance at a tolerance
ed ucation program if the victim or propert y was
intentiona lly selected because of t he defendant's
bia s or prejudice against a group identified by
certain cha racteristics (S ubtype 2.3)

S 1455

en hancement w hich add s incarceration rime

• Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2010) agg ravating factor if defendant se lected the
victim or property damaged in a crime, in
who le or in part, beca use of a bel ief or perccption rega rding the characteristics; protected

Texas
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• 13 Y.S.A . S 1458 (2010) - provides definiti ons
which the state 's hare crime statures use

Virginia

• Ya . Code Ann. § 18.2-57 (2010) - sentencing
enhancement which increases inca rcera tion time
for assa ult when the victim was selected beca use
of the victim's c harac teris tics (S ubrype 2.4)
• Ya. Code . Ann. S 18.2-423 (2010) - prohibits
burning a cross with rhe intent ro intimidate a
person or group of people (Subt ype 4.1)
• Ya. Code. Ann . S 18.2 -423 . I (20 10)- prohibits
placing a swastik a on any place of worship or
a ny place owned and opera ted by a religious
body, w ith the intent ro intimidate a person or
gro up of people (Subt ype 4.1 )
• Ya . Code. Ann. S 18.2- 423 .2 (2010) - prohibits
placing a noose in a number of places, with the
intent ro inti midate a person or group of people
(Subt ype 4.1)
• Ya. Code Ann. S 18.2-127 (2010)- prohibits
desecration of a place of worship or place of
burial, or many o bjects associa ted with those
places (Subt ype 4. 2)
• Va. Code Ann . S 18 .2-138 (2010)- includes
breaking any window or door on a house of
public worship (Subtype 4.2)

69

CRIMINALIZING HATE

II IU'>l>ll 110'.

Washington
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• Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 9A.36.080 (2010) new crime prohibiting causing physical injury,
damaging property, or threatens to do something which puts the victim in reasonable fear
harm a person or property, when the defendant
maliciously and intentionally commits the act
because of his or her perception of the victim's
characteristics; allows inference that the defendant intended to threaten the victim when the
defendant burns a cross on an African American's
property or places a swastika on the property of
a Jewish person's properry (Subtype 1.2)

Wyoming

•Rev. Code Wash . (ARCW) § 9A.36.078 (2010) legislative findings relating to some of the
inferences allowed for the state's hate crime
statutes
• Rev. Code Wash . (ARCW) § 9.61.160 (2010) includes desecration of a place of worship
(Subtype 4.2)
West Virginia

AMERICA'S HAT E CR IME LAWS: A SYNOPSIS

Ifl,\lE-CIU,\1[ S1ATUTES
•Wyo. Stat. § 6-9-102 (2010) - new crime of
denying a person the right to life , liberty or
rhe pursuit of happ iness or the necessities of
life beca use of the victim 's characteris tics
(Subtype 1.3)

Subtype 1.1: Prohibit L'.om mirrin g ot her c..:rirrn:s, hut aJJ a hias cll'mcnr
Suhr ypc 1. 2: Prohibit spcdfil.'. anio ns when 1..:ommittcJ hcl.'.a ust• of hias
Suhrypc 1.3: Prohihir Jcpriv<trion of or inn.: r krin~ wirh ;.rnothcr's c..:ivi l ri!!,ht s
Subtype 2. 1: lrn.: rcaSl' th e deg ree of a ll , or almost a ll , i:rimc s
Subrypc 2.2: lni.:rcasc Jcgrcc of i.:rimcs in vo lvin A intimic.larinn or h:lrassmcnr
Subrypl' 2 ..1 : A<l<l jail timl' o r o th l· r c.:unsc qm·ncl'S for all , or a lm ost all , cr illl l'S
Suhrypc 2.4: AJd jail timl' or orhcr co nscqul'!lc.:cs for c.: rim cs invol ving hara ss mcnr or
inrimi<l atio n
Subtn>..: 3. 1: Dcdarc hias to he an aggravating fo<.:rnr for all cri me:-.
Subtype 3.2 : Dcdarl' hia s to be an ag~ ra vating factor for nimcs in vo lvin g lrn r1.1ssmcnr nr
inrimi<lation
Subt ypl' 4. I: Prohibit Jisplayin)!. sym hol s of Ila re o r hia s
Suhtypc 4.2: Dcsc:cration

• W. Va. Code S 61-6-21 (2010) - establishes a
person's right to be free of violence or intimidation committed against that person because
of his or her characteristics; interference with
that right by force, injury, intimidation or
threats is a new crime; conspiring to interfere

with rights is also a new crime; teaching techniques to interfere with rights is also a new
crime (Subtype 1.2)
• W. Va. Code S 61-6-21(d) (2010) - aggravating
factor if any crime was committed because of
the victim's characteristics (Subtype 3.1)
• W. Va . Code§ 61-6-13 (2010) - prohibits interfering with religious assemblies (Subtype 1.3)
Wisconsin

•Wis. Stat. S 939.645 (2010) - sentencing
enhancement for specific substantive offenses if
the defendant intentionally selected the victim
or property because of a belief or perception
regarding the characteristics of that person,
whether or not the belief or perception was
correct; increases inca rceration time for most

offenses, but increases level of the crime for
highest level misdemeanors (Subtype 2.1
and 2.3)
•Wis. Stat. S 943.012 (2010) - includes desecration of a place of worship, or of a place of
burial or memorializing the dead (Subtype 4.2)
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PROT EC T E D C HARA CTE RISTI CS BY jURISDI C TION
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'General statures are t hose whi c h dn nm lisr wha 1 pa rtic ul ar c haracte ris ti cs are protected.

""c:5
u

"'C

c

u

The se imply rh a r h ias, pre jud ice o r hare regard in g a n y charac ter is t ics mi g ht ma ke th e st a te's
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~ Fo r purposes o f thi s c ha rt , .. rel ig ion " a nd .. c reed" a re used int erc hangeab ly. even when li sred
se parat ely in a srn rut e.
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JAlaska do es nor ri e hia s to 11ge, ill hea lth or homeless ness. The stat ut e instead makes it an
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aggrava t ing focmr if t he d c fc ndanr knew rh e vic tim w a s pa rr ic ul a rl y vulncrah le o r incapa hl e
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o f res isrance due ro th ese or a ny or her facto rs. Disa bilit y is one or th ese factors, but it is a lso
o ne or t he protected characte ri sti cs for th e Stat e's hias Statute.
'Con nec tic ut also li st s a li enagc ;is a protec ted charac teristic.
(Illino is docs not ti e bi as m 11ge o r physica l hand icap. The state's sta tute instead ma kes it a n
agg rav:11 in g foctur merely i ( the vict im has th ese characteristics.
"Iowa a lso lists po litica l aHl li:ltion as a pro tected ch:uac teristic.
., Kansas does nor ti e hi as to age, infi rmity a nd red uced physical or menta l capacit y. The
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Mainc docs nut tie bias ro agc. The su re's srar ute instead makes it an aggrava tin g fac to r
mcrel y if th e victim has age related cha racte ri stics.
~Mi ssi ss ip p i stat ur e docs not tie bias to age o r di sa bi lit y. The state's statur e instea d make s it
an aggrav:lting factor merely i( th e vic tim has these cha racte r ist ics.
•uMonrana a lso li srs invo lve ment in civi l rights o r hum an rig hts ac tivities as a pmrecrcd
c harac teri stic.
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in volv in g th e use of fo rce aga inst a person o r involvin g financi a l theft , with the intention o f
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ll• We sr Virgini a includes po lirica l affili atio n as a protected charac teri stic.
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EXPLAINING TYP ES OF HA TE CR IM ES

tween one and five years. This additional sentence must
run consecutively (after the sentence for the underlying
crime has been served).
Louisiana has a law that increases the potential penalty for defendants convicted of a hate crime. It differs
from the Rhode Island statute by listing the underlying
crimes to which it applies. However, the list is so extensive
that the statute essentially applies to almost any crime
which could be committed against the person or property
of another because of the other's characteristics, including
crimes beyond those typically intended to intimidate or
harass. The statute makes it "unlawful for any person to
select the victim of the following offenses against person
or property because of actual or perceived race, age, gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, or ancestry of that person or the owner
or occupant of that property because of actual or perceived membership or service in, or employment with, an
organization."58 The statute lists 33 crimes against person
or property, ranging from murder to molestation to "communicating false information of planned arson." 59 The
court is permitted to sentence a defendant who falls under
this statute to an additional $500 fine or an additional six
months' incarceration, or both, if the underlying crime is
a misdemeanor. If the underlying crime is a felony, the
defendant may be fined an additional $5,000, or sentenced to an additional five years' incarceration, or both.
As in Rhode Island, the enhanced sentences in Louisiana run consecutively. A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, which usually permits a maximum sentence of

up to one year's incarceration, can be sentenced to up to
18 months. However, the criminal degree is not enhanced
to a felony. As noted above, there is no consensus over
how the enhancement statute affects subject-matter jurisdiction . It is unclear if a lower criminal court judge, with
jurisdiction limited to misdemeanors, would still have
subject-matter jurisdiction if the misdemeanor had a
maximum possible sentence of more than one year, which
is typically felony-only territory.
We also place statutes that mandate collateral punishments into Subtype 2.3. Collateral punishments are penalties other than incarceration. The most common collateral
punishments for hate or bias-related crimes are fines and
reparations, community service, and participation in diversity programs. Most of the jurisdictions which have enacted these collateral punishments have tied them to specific intimidation and harassment crimes. However, a few
have tied the collateral punishments to all, or almost all,
hate or bias-related crimes.
California has two statutes that allow or mandate
community service as an additional punishment for people convicted of bias-related crimes. One of these is related
to specific intimidation acts that are intended to interfere
with the rights of others and motivated by the victim's
characteristics. California also has a catch-all statute authorizing the court to "order a defendant who is convicted
of a hate crime to perform a minimum of community service, not to exceed 400 hours, to be performed _over a period not to exceed 350 days." 6° California separately defines hate crime to mean "a criminal act committed, in
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